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Note

The Patentability of Living
Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101:
In Re Bergy
In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Parkerv. Bergy, 98 S. Ct. 3119
(1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
In a landmark decision the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in In re Bergy' held that a microorganism 2 may be
patented by its inventor, thus addressing the unsettled question of
whether
living things are statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. 3 Section 101 provides the following definition of categories of
patentable subject matter.
Inventions patentable.
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this titleft

In the age of outstanding developments in discoveries of microorganisms and their usefulness in chemical, pharmaceutical and
related industries,5 the holding in Bergy bridges the gap between
1. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom Parker v.
Bergy, 98 S. Ct. 3119 (1978).
2. Microorganism is the general term for a living organism of microscopic or
ultramicroscopic size.
3. (1976).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
5. See Wegner, PatentingNature'sSecrets-Microorganisms,7 hT'L REV. INDUS.
PRop. & COPYRiGHT L. (1976). The author presents a timely example of the
imperative need for the development of microorganisms. In the future, the
world will be faced with shortages not only in fuel and mineral supplies, but
also in essential chemical starting materials such as steroids used in the
manufacture of the "Pill." A recent discovery employing the chemical characteristics of a microorganism has revealed a new source of the steroid used
in the "Pill," thereby averting the threatened shortage.
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these discoveries and the previous lack of legal mechanisms available to protect and encourage microbiological research. While the
court specifically limited the scope of its holding to microorganisms,6 an important and interesting question is whether the decision will be extended to other living things, i.e., whether a patent
will be obtainable for recombinant DNA discoveries 7 or a new, improved strain of chicken. 8
The United States Constitution extends Congress the authority
to enact legislation necessary to protect inventions: 9 "The Congress shall have power... To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authorslol and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."" Since 1790 Congress has continuously fulfilled this
12
mandate and provided federal statutory protection to inventors.
A patent is a contract between the inventor and the United
States that is designed to be an incentive for the private production of inventions which will benefit the public. The court in Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 1 3 succinctly
stated the policy and operations of the patent statute:
Inventive minds may fail to produce many useful things that they would
produce if stimulated by the promise of a substantial reward; what is produced is the property of the inventor he and his heirs and assigns may
hold it as a secret till the end of time; the public would be largely benefited
by obtaining conveyances of these new properties; so the people through
their representatives say to the inventor Deed us your property, possession to be yielded at the end of 17 years, and in the meantime we will
protect you absolutely in the right to exclude everyone from making, using
6. 563 F.2d at 1035.
7. See Brief for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks at 20, In re Bergy,
563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Parker v.
Bergy, 98 S. Ct 3119 (1978). See also Otten, PatentingLife, Wall St. J., Jan. 26,
1978, at 16, col. 3. The commentator reported on In re Chakrabarty, 153 F.2d 40
(C.C.P.A. 1978), which was argued before the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals on December 5, 1977, and was decided on March 2, 1978. In that case,
General Electric Co. sought a patent on a bacteria that "contains extrachromosomal genetic material that produces oil-degrading enzymes-a
discovery of obvious use in combating oil spills." Otten, supra,at 18. To declare such an invention patentable, the commentator stated, arguably "moves
a significant step closer towards recombinant DNA technology." Id.
8. See In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P-.A 1975). See also notes 66-68 & accompanying text infra.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. This clause empowers the Congress to enact copyright laws for the protection
of authors. These provisions are codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
11. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202 (1843).
12. See 1 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 12-13 (2d ed. 1964). The
last major legislative changes occurred in 1952. The patent laws are presently
codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976).
13. 154 F. 358 (7th Cir. 1907).
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or vending the thing patented, without your permission.

14

While the effort, expense and genius of the inventor may be
substantial, so is the seventeen years of governmental protection.
This patent protection is in essence a monopoly on the invention
and cannot be granted without careful examination of the patentee's claim. Accordingly, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 10215 and 35
U.S.C. § 10316 to ensure that "[t] he invention... serve[ s] the ends
of science-push [es] back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and
the like; and make [s] a distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge."'17 Section 102 provides that an invention must be novel. If
an invention has been known or used by others in this country, or
has been patented or described in a printed publication in this
country or a foreign country before the patentee's claim to the invention, the patent will be disallowed by the Commissioner of Patents. Additionally, section 103 requires that the invention be nonobvious: "[I]f the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains,"'1 8 a patent will not be obtainable. To be patentable, section 101 also requires an invention to be "useful."19
The requirement of utility is generally considered the least exact20
ing of the patent conditions. Justice Story in Lowell v. Lewis
stated, "[a]ll that the law requires is, that the invention should not
be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or morals of
into the act in
society. The word 'useful,' therefore, is incorporated
'21
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral."
This note deals specifically with section 10122 which defines the
categories of patentable inventions. Before the conditions of sections 102 and 103 become relevant, the subject matter of the invention must be deemed patentable under section 101.23 This
question of patentability was presented to the court in In re
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 361.
(1976). See generally 1 A. DELLER,supra note 12, §§ 54-82.
(1976). See generally 1 A. DELLER,supra note 12, § 106.
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147,154 (1950)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
Id. § 101.
15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568). See generally 1 A. DELLER, supra
note 12, §§ 83-101.
15 F. Cas. at 1019.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See also note 4 & accompanying text supra.
While this appears the logical approach to a patent application, the Solicitor
of the Patent Office contended that such was not the case in the patent application of Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). See
notes 103-07 & accompanying text infra.
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Bergy.2 4
II. HISTORY OF THE PATENT APPLICATION
On June 10, 1974, the Upjohn Company filed an application for a
patent on a "Process. '25 Claims one through four 26 in the application described the process as a microbiological process which produced the antibiotic lincomycin with increased recovery efficiency.
Claim five added by amendment on January 14, 1975,27 described
the microorganism which became the subject of this action: "A bio24. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Parker v.
Bergy, 98 S. Ct. 3119 (1978). See Case Comment, The Patentabilityof Living
Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101; In re Bergy, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1357 (1978);
Note, In re Bergy: Patentabilityof Micro-Organisms:Legal Controlof Life, 47
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 130 (1978).
25. See Record at 32, In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.PA. 1977). The inventors of
the process, Malcolm E. Bergy, John H. Coats and Vedpal S. Malik, appointed
the legal counsel at the Upjohn Company to prosecute the application for the
patent. Id. at 26. The Upjohn counsel continued to represent the inventors
through the appeal process.
The title "Process" was changed by an amendment dated Jan. 23, 1975, to
"Process For Preparing Lincomycin." A process claim was defined by the
Court in Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876), as "a mode of treatment of
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be transformed and reduced to a different
state or thing." Id. at 787-88.
An abstract of the disclosure for the Bergy process stated:
Microbiological process for preparing antibiotic lincomycin at
temperatures ranging from 180 C. to 450 C. using the newly discovered microorganism Streptomyces vellosus. The subject process advantageously results in the preparation of lincomycin without the
concomitant production of lincomycin B (4'-depropyl-4'ethyllincomycin). The absence of lincomycin B production results in increased
lincomycin recovery efficiency.
Record, supra at 6.
26. Claims one through four read:
-1-

A novel process for preparing the antibiotic lincomycin which
comprises cultivating Streptomyces vellosus, having the identifying
characteristics of NRRL 8037, and lincomycin-producing mutants
thereof, in an aqueous nutrient medium under aerobic conditions until substantial antibiotic activity is imparted to said medium by the
production of lincomycin.
-2A process, according to claim 1, wherein the cultivation is conducted at a temperature range of about 180 C. to about 450 C.
-3A process, according to claim 1, wherein said aqueous nutrient
medium contains a source of assimilable carbohydrate and assimilable nitrogen.
-4A process, according to claim 1, wherein said lincomycin is isolated from the fermentation broth.
Record, supra note 25, at 25.
27. Id. at 28.
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logically pure culture of the microorganism Streptomyces vellosus,
having the identifying characteristics of NRRL 8037, said culture

being capable of producing the antibiotic lincomycin in the recoverable quantity upon fermentation in an aqueous nutrient medium
containing assimilable sources of carbon, nitrogen and inorganic
substances."28
Claim five of the Bergy application was disallowed by the Patent and Trademark Office Examiner on February 6, 1975, because it
sought to patent nonstatutory subject matter.29 The Examiner rejected the claim to patent the microorganism on the basis of the
product of nature rule.3 0 This rule is a judicially created standard
which has been invoked by the courts and the Patent Office to refuse a patent because the "invention" was known to occur in nature prior to the patentee's claim to it3l or because the invention

had not been sufficiently altered by the inventor to constitute either a manufacture or a novelty.32 As authority for rejection on
that basis, the Examiner cited the supportive dicta of In re
Mancy:33
Here appellants not only have no allowed claim to the novel strain of
Streptomyces used in their processbut would, we presume (without deciding), be unableto obtainsuch a claim because the strain, while new in the
by any art of record, is, as we understand it, a
sense that it is not ' shown
34
"product of nature.
28. Id. at 76. The detailed description of the microorganism invention submitted
by Upjohn readThe Microorganism
The novel actinomycete used according to this invention for the
production of lincomycin is Streptomyces vellosus. One of its strain
characteristics is the production of lincomycin without the concomitant production lincomycin B. Another of its strain characteristics is
the production of comparable titers of lincomycin at a temperature of
28° C. and 450 C. A subculture of this living organism can be obtained upon request from the permanent collection of the Northern
Regional Research Laboratories, Agricultural Research Services,
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Peoria, Illinois, U.SA Its accession
number in this repository is NRRL 8037.
Id. at 8.
29.
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as non-statutory subject matter. Claim 5 claims a product of nature (Streptomyces vellosus
NRRL 8037). See In re Mancy et al. 182 U.S.P.Q. 303 at page 306, second sentence before [4].
Claims 1-4 are allowable in view of the declaration filed January
27, 1975.
Id. at 34.
30. Id.
31. See American Wood-Paper Co. v. The Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23
WalL) 566 (1874).
32. See American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
33. 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P-.A 1974). See notes 81-82 & accompanying text infra.
34. 499 F.2d at 1294 (emphasis added).
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On February 18, 1975, in response to the rejection, Upjohn filed
a Request for Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 197. 35 The request
was supplemented by the supporting affidavits of three scientists
which attested to the facts that
the manufacture of the "biologically pure culture" of Claim 5 is obtainable
only by the discovery and skills of a microbiologist; that the "biologically
pure culture" of Claim 5 is not found in nature; that the taxonomic
description on pages 4-16 of the specification is only for a "biologically
pure culture "of the microorganism; that the fermentation conditions and
procedures disclosed in the subject application are for a "biologically pure
culture"; and, that the expected fermentation results are completely
different for the "biologically pure culture" of Claim 5 as compared to an
impure culture.
In view of the above, it is respectfully submitted that Claim 5 is not
or a "proddirected to a "product of nature," but, rather, a "manufacture"
36
uct of a microbiologist" which is clearly patentable.

On April 22, 1975, the Examiner again rejected claim five stating
that it "defines a microorganism, which is a product of nature and
not a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof as required by 35 U.S.C.
101."3 7 Supporting this final rejection based on the product of nature rule, the Examiner cited in addition to In re Mancy, 38 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp. 39 and Funk Brothers Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.4o In GuarantyTrust Co.,41 an action was
brought for infringement of a process involving bacteriological fermentation in the production of acetone and butyl alcohol. The defendant denied infringement and claimed the patent was invalid
because, inter alia, the process was unpatentable subject matter.
The court stated:
Lastly, the defendant contends that the invention of the Weizmann
patent is unpatentable since it is for the life process of a living organism.
Were the patent for bacteria per se, a different situation would be
presented. As before stated, the patent is not for bacteria per se. It is for a
Weizmarn under
fermentation process employing bacteria discovered 4by
2
conditions set forth in the specifications'and claims.

The dicta that a different situation would be presented if the
Weizmarm patent claim had been for the bacteria per se was considered "especially pertinent" by the Examiner in his determination that the microorganism was unpatentable.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

37 C.F.R. § 1.197 (1977).
Record, supra note 25, at 37 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 55.
499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931), a fd, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932).
333 U.S. 127 (1948).
54 F.2d 400 (D. DeL 1931), affid, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932).
54 F.2d at 410 (emphasis added).
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Funk Brothers Seed Co.,43 cited as additional authority by the
Examiner, was an infringement action in which the validity of the
patent for a compatible mixture of Rhizobia, bacteria used in an
inoculant highly useful in the farming industry, was challenged.
Citing the Court's invalidation of the patent in Funk Brothers Seed
Co., the Examiner stated:
[T]he Supreme Court observed that the inventor "ascertained that...
strains can, by certain methods of selection and testing, be isolated and
used in mixed cultures." The Supreme Court held that they could not
hold invention "without allowing a patent to issue on one of the ancient
secrets of nature now disclosed." 4

In Bergy, the Examiner's final rejection also challenged
Upjohn's contention that there was precedent for a patent claim to
materials made pure by human intervention. 45 Because the microorganism was considered a "biologically pure culture," this precedent was important to the argument for patentability. As authority
for this argument, Upjohn had cited Merck & Co. v. Chase Chemical
Co. 46 and Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.47 Both
courts had held vitamin B 12 patentable despite challenges that the
vitamin was simply a purified product of nature. Additional authority was provided by Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabrikenof Elberfeld
Co., 48 in which the courtheld asprin purified in the manufacturing
process was patentable although the impure asprin compound is
found in nature. The recent decision of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in In re Bergstrom49 further sustained Upjohn's
contention. In Bergstrom the court had held that pure chemical
compounds which had been isolated from extracts of an animal
fluid were patentable. However, the Examiner in Bergy distinguished these holdings5 0 as pertaining only to "pure chemical compounds as contrasted with the instant microorganism."5 1 It was
the Examiner's view that the methods of isolating these microorgatheir
nisms were "standard and commonplace" and did not alter
52
natural products sufficiently to consider them inventions.
43. 333.U.S. 127 (1948).
44. Record, supra note 25, at 55-56 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948)).
45. Record, supra note 25, at 56.
46. 273 F. Supp. 68 (D.N.J. 1967).
47. 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
48. 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 220 U.S. 622 (1911).
49. 427 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P-. 1970).
50. Cited by the applicants in Bergy as additional precedent for the patentability
of claims limited to pure materials were Ex parte Hillyer & Nicewander, 102
U.S.P.Q. 126 (1953), In re Williams, 171 F.2d 319 (C.C.PA. 1948), Ex parte
Parke & Lawson, 64 U.S.P.Q. 335 (1944), and Park-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford
& Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
51. Record, supra note 25, at 56.
52. In a reply brief directed to the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
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Following the Examiner's final rejection of claim five, the
Upjohn Company petitioned the Board of Appeals of the Patent
Office for a review of its claim to the microorganism. 5 3 While the
Examiner's rejections had concluded that the microorganism was
not patentable because it claimed a product of nature, the Board,
without explanation, reframed the question presented to it on appeal.9 The issue addressed and decided by the Board was
"whether or not a microorganism, being a living thing, is or is not
within the realm of statutory patentable subject matter. 5 5s The
Board upheld the Examiner's rejection, but its approach was a decided departure from the Examiner's product of nature approach.
Holding that section 101 should be strictly construed, the Board
not fall within the four categories
stated that a living organism 5did
6
of patentable subject matter.
An analogous result has been reached by the courts with respect to non-

53.
54.

55.
56.

Upjohn addressed the new issues raised in the Examiner's final rejection and
distinguished Guaranty Trust Co. and Funk Bros. Seed Co. as inapposite to
the direct issue of the patentability of the microorganism. Record, supra note
25, at 51. (The reply brief was filed pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.193(b) (1977)). In
Bergy, the Examiner had cited the language of the court in Guaranty Trust
Co. that a different issue of patentability would have arisen had the claim
been solely for bacteria rather than the patentable Weizmann process.
Upjohn dismissed that language as dictum and, therefore, of no precedential
value for the Examiner's rejection. Record, supra note 25, at 57. See also
note 35 & accompanying text supra.
Further, Upjohn contended that Funk Bros. Seed Co. was inapposite to the
patent application because it was "not claiming a material which is found in
nature and doing what the material is known to do in nautre [sic]." Record,
supra note 25, at 57. The bacteria in Funk Bros. Seed Co. and its natural nitrogen-fixing function had been previously known in the art. Species of the
bacteria had been used in the manufacture of less useful forms of inoculants.
The microorganism in Bergy, however, was not previously known to the art.
Nor did the impure form of the microorganism found in nature naturally produce the antibiotic lincomycin. That was a result brought about by human
intervention.
In the final statement of the reply brief, Upjohn addressed the Examiner's
contention that Guaranty Trust Co., Funk Bros. Seed Co., and Mancy all involved "isolated or biologically pure microorganisms" and, therefore, were
precedent for the unpatentability of the microorganism. Record, supra note
25, at 56. In its view, the validity of the examiner's statement was unsound
"since (1) none of the decisions cited, nor any known decision, has held that a
'biologically pure culture' is unpatentable, and (2) there is no evidence that a
'biologically pure culture' was in issue in any of the cited decisions." Id. at 58.
Record, supra note 25, at 59.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals explained the Board's abandonment of the product of nature basis of the rejection: 'The circumstances persuade us that the board went in search of another reason to support the
rejection because it realized the Examiner's position was untenable." 563
F.2d at 1035.
Record, supra note 25, at 62 (emphasis added).
Id.
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patentability of mental processes, printed matter or methods of doing
business none of which are also expressly excluded by the indicated section of the statute,5 7but neither can they be said or have been held to be
included thereby.

The Board,reasoned further that while section 101 did not expressly exclude living things as acceptable subject matter, Congress had found it essential to supplement the statute with the
Plant Patent Act of 1930.58 This legislation extended to agriculturalists, presumably for the first time, the same patent protection
which had been traditionally provided to inventors. The Board determined that if section 101 could have been construed to include
living things prior to 1930, there would have been no need for the
Plant Patent Act;59 claims for living plant inventions would have
proceeded in the normal course of patent applications. The Board
further relied upon the legislative history of the Plant Patent Act
of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 197060 to conclude
"that Congress [did not] intend 35 U.S.C. § 101 to encompass'61any
living organism, whether they be plants or microorganisms."
Following the Board's adverse decision, Upjohn appealed to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.6 2 The court responded to
the confusion over the grounds for rejection caused by the different theories presented by the Examiner and the Board and delineated its own view on both the product of nature and the "living"
theories. It dismissed the product of nature issue by stating that
"[t] he biologically pure culture of Claim 5 clearly does not exist in,
is not found in, and is not a product of, 'nature.' It is man-made and
can be produced only under carefully controlled laboratory conditions. '63 The court then proceeded to decide the issue as framed
by the Solicitor of the Patent and Trademark Office: "Whether the
uncontroverted fact that the biologically pure culture, as claimed,
is alive removes it from the categories of inventions enumerated in
§ 101."64 Reversing both the Examiner and the Board, the court
held that it did not.65
The court was prompt to state that it was not deciding the question left unanswered in In re Merat,66 but only the question involved in the patent application in Bergy: whether microorganisms
found to be new, useful and unobvious are patentable under sec57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1976).
Record, supra note 25, at 62.
7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1976).
Record, supra note 25, at 63.
The appeal was made pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
563 F.2d at 1035.
Id.
Id.
519 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P-.A 1975).

312
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tion 101. In re Merat6 7 involved a patent application entitled
"Method of Improving Strains of Chickens." The Examiner had rejected all of the claims as being nonstatutory subject matter "on
the theory that a method of breeding animals [was] not a 'process'
within the meaning of § 101 and that a 'thing occurring in nature'
[presumably the chicken of claim 2] under controlled propagation
[was] not a manufacture. '68 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals dismissed the need to discuss the patentability of the strain
of chickens, and upheld the Board's rejection of the Merat claim
based on section 112,69 which requires that the claim language
when read by a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains describe the invention with sufficient precision to
enable the person to duplicate and use the invention. The language of the claim in Merat was ambiguous as to the subject matter to be used in the breeding process and the contemplated
results of the breeding.
In the analysis of precedential authority to determine the patentability of living things, the court in Bergy initially distinguished
the "peripheral court comments" relied upon by the solicitor as
precedent for the proposition that microorganisms were not included within section 101.70 In re Mancy,7 1 the first case to be distinguished by the court, involved a patent claim on a
microbiological process used for the production of a known antibiotic. Reversing the Board's determination that the process claim
was obvious, the court in Mancy set forth the dicta relied upon by
the solicitor in Bergy, that while the strain was new, it was still a
"product of nature. '72 Stating that the dicta in Mancy was ill-considered in light of the court's new knowledge on the isolation and
development of microorganisms, the court in Bergy held the language in Mancy to be pertinent only to the issue of novelty as applied to "something pre-existing and merely plucked from the
earth and claimed as such, a far cry from the biologically pure culture [of Bergy] produced by great labor .... 73
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1393.
69. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in
the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id., Para. 1.
70. 563 F.2d at 1035.
71. 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
72. Id. at 1294. For complete quote, see text accompanying note 34 supra.
73. 563 F.2d at 1036.
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The court in Bergy also dismissed the Examiner's reliance 74 on
the statement in GuarantyTrust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp.75 that
"[wjere the patent for the bacteria per se, a different situation
would be presented."7 6 It distinguished the statement as "a trite
observation of minimal magnitude as precedent, dealing with a
non-issue on which no opinion was expressed. '77 Instead, the
court found Guaranty Trust Co. pertinent to the argument favoring
the patentability of living organisms because that decision had rejected the argument that the subject claim should be considered
unpatentable because it employed the life process of a living organism. The court stated that Guaranty Trust Co. is, indeed, exemplary of the line of cases holding "that processes, one of the
categories of patentable subject matter specified in section 101, are
uniformly and consistently considered to be statutory subject matter notwithstanding the 78
employment therein of living organisms
and their life processes.1
The court noted that there is nothing within section 101 that expressly excludes living organisms. It rejected the assertion that
merely because a biologically pure manufacture or composition of
matter is living, it is removed from the categories of patentable
subject matter, when processes which employ the life functions of
7 9
microorganisms have consistently been held to be patentable.
The court reasoned that because section 101 makes no distinction
between manufactures and compositions of matter on the one
hand and processes on the other, the argument that manufactures
and compositions of matter which are alive are, therefore, not patentable must fail even under the strict construction proposed by
74. See note 42 & accompanying text supra.
75. 54 F.2d 400 (D. DeL 1931), affd, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932).
76. 563 F.2d at 1036 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Solvents, 54 F.2d at
410). For complete quote, see text accompanying note 42 supra.
77. 563 F.2d at 1036.
78. Id. at 1037. In response to the majority's contention that since processes using the microorganism are patentable subject matter, the microorganism itself should be, the dissent cited recent computer program cases in which an
analogous issue confronted the courts. Id. at 1041. These cases held that algorithms contained in programs or processes used to operate a computer are
patentable whereas patent claims directed to the algorithm itself are not.
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611

(C.C.P.A. 1977) (Waldbaum II).
The dissent concluded that "the fact that claims directed to a process of
using microorganisms constitute patentable subject matter does not logically

compel the conclusion that claims to biologically pure cultures of microorganisms are patentable." 563 F.2d at 1041. Finally, the dissent stated that to
have the court extend the patent laws to living things based upon a theory of
public interest is to abrogate its duty to adjudicate within the scope of the
intent of the patent statute as enacted by Congress.
79. Id. at 1037.
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the Board. 80
Consistent with the limited scope of its holding, the court in
Bergy further stated that the functions of the microorganism were
"more akin to inanimate chemical compositions such as reactants,
reagents and catalysts than they are to horses and honeybees or
raspberries and roses."8 1 On the premise that microorganisms are
"important tools" in the chemical industry the court held that
there was
no sound reason to refuse patent protection to the microorganisms themselves-a kind of tool used by chemists and chemical manufacturers in
much the same way as they use chemical elements, compounds, and compositions which are not considered to be alive, notwithstanding their capacities to react and to promote reaction to produce new compounds and
compositions by chemical processes in much the same way as do microorganisms we think it is in the public interest to include microorganisms
within the terms "manufacture" and "composition of matter" in § 101. In
short, we think the fact that microorganisms, distinguished from chemical
compounds, are alive is a distinction without legal significance .... 82

In its final statement, the majority summarily dismissed the relevancy of the Plant Patent Act of 1930,83 and the legislative history
of that provision as presented in In re Arzberger,84 as authority for
the nonpatentability of living things. In Arzberger, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals concluded that the Plant Patent Act
was enacted for the express benefit of agriculture. The court held
that bacteria, although scientifically defined as plants, did not fall
within the agricultural purposes intended by Congress and were,
therefore, not patentable under the Plant Patent Act. 85 In the view
of the Bergy Court, the legislative analysis in Arzberger was irrelevant to the issue of what constituted patentable subject matter
under section 101.86
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1038. The dissent challenged the majority's amorphous attempt to distinguish between microorganisms and more complex animals. Contrary to
the majority's conclusion that the microorganism and chemical compounds
function in similar ways, the dissent stated that microorganisms are "fundamentally different from inanimate chemical compositions [in that] both the
microorganisms claimed herein and honeybees are alive, reproduce, and act
upon other materials to form technologically useful products (lincomycin and
honey, respectively)." Id. at 1039. The dissent concluded that the majority's
limitation of its holding to microorganisms is readily assailable unless it can
substantiate the argument that microorganisms are more like chemical compounds than the honeybee or other higher forms of life.
82. Id. at 1038.
83. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1976).
84. 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A 1940).
85. Id. at 838.
86. Whereas the majority summarily dismissed the relevance of the Plant Patent
Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1976), and Plant Variety Protection Act of
1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1976), the dissent agreed with the Board's rejection
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On June 26, 1978, in Parker v. Bergy,87 the United States
Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, dispensed with oral arguments and vacated the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals'
landmark decision in Bergy. The Court's summary action in Bergy
was achieved without any discussion of the many controversial
policy questions that In re Bergy had presented. 88 The only indication of the ground for the vacation was the order for remand for
of the very recent Supreme Court defurther consideration in light
89
cision in Parkerv. Flook.
In Flook, the respondent had applied for a patent on a method
for updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion processes.
The single novel feature of the invention was a mathematical
formula for which the inventor had identified a limited category 4f
useful, though conventional, post-solution applications. In a prior
case, Gottschalk v. Benson,90 the Supreme Court had held that a
novel and useful mathematical formula could not be patented because it would be, in essence, a patent on an idea, a result in clear
contravention of the patent laws.91 The specific question before
the Court in Flook, however, was whether that mathematical
formula could be distinguished from the Benson formula and held
patentable under section 10192 because the inventor intended only
to use the formula in a limited fashion.9 3 In other words, the inventor did not seek to totally preempt the use of the mathematical
formula.9 4
In Flook the Court disallowed the patent on the formula. 95 The
technical reasons it advanced for the disallowance of the claim are
not important to this discussion. Rather, the general view of the
patent laws evinced by the Supreme Court in Flook provides the
background for its vacation of Bergy.
In justifying the disallowance of the patent in Flook, the Court
recognized that much of its reasoning was based on precedent de-

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

of claim five. Relying upon the legislative history of these two statutes, the
dissent concluded that no living organisms-plants or animals-were intended to be patentable subject matter under section 101. If section 101 were
construed so broadly as to include live subject matter, the special legislation
extended for the protection of new, useful, and unobvious plants would have
been superfluous. 563 F.2d at 1040.
98 S. Ct. 3119 (1978).
See note 174 & accompanying text infra.
98 S. Ct. 2522 (1978).
409 U.S. 63 (1972).
See note 126 & accompanying text infra.
See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
98 S. Ct. at 2523.
Id. at 2524.
Id. at 2528.
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cided well before the advent of modern computers. 96 The Court
made express efforts to clarify that its rejection of the claim was
not to be interpreted "as reflecting a judgment that patent protection of certain novel and useful computer programs [would] not
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, or that such
protection is undesirable as a matter of policy. '9 7 Rather, it concluded that these controversial questions of policy are to be answered by Congress, which possesses the more competent means
of assessing the appropriate categories of patentable things:
It is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in light
of our prior precedents, and we must proceed cautiously when we are
asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress.
As Mr. Justice White explained in writing for the Court in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp .... :
"[W] e should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument for expansion of privilege is based on more than mere
inference from ambiguous statutory language. We would require
a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the
position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the
beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than the courts had previously thought. No such signal

legitimizes respondent's position in this litigation. 98

II. ANALYSIS OF IN RE BERGY
This note will examine the validity and effect of the decision of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Bergy in the context
of the following three inquiries: (1) whether after a review of precedential authority, "living things" can be reasonably defined to fall
within the categories of patentable subject matter in section 101;
(2) whether the statutory provisions providing patent protection
for plants preclude the interpretation that living things fall within
section 101; and (3) whether In re Bergy will have an impact on
American patent law.
A.

Patent Case Law

There has been no direct discussion in case law of living organisms and their patentability under section 101.99 The two authorities relied on by the Board for their supporting dictum, In re
Mancy'0 0 and Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Union Solvents
Corp.,10 1 were dismissed by the court in Bergy as "peripheral
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 2529.
Id. (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)).
Brief, supra note 7, at 10.
499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P-.A 1974).
54 F.2d 400 (D. Del 1931), affid, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932).

1978]

PATENTABILITY OF ORGANISMS
02

court comments.'
Surprisingly, however, Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,' 0 3 was not discussed by the court in Bergy as supporting

authority for the patentability of the microorganism. Funk Brothers Seed Co. involved a patent claim for a mixture of noninhibitive
strains of nitrogen-fixing bacteria used in an inoculant useful to
the agricultural industry. 0 4 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held the invention valid and, therefore, patentable because
the patentee had done "much more than discover a law of nature."'0 5 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, but not on the
ground that the bacteria mixture was nonstatutory matter. The
Court held that the discovery that certain strains of bacteria could
be mixed without deleterious effects to the properties of either was
not an invention because it was only an uncovering of the qualities
of inhibition and thus a finding of the "handiwork of nature."' 0 6
The majority in Funk Brothers Seed Co., speaking through Justice
Douglas, intimated that living organisms are indeed patentable
subject matter, for the opinion did not expressly state that the
bacteria per se are not patentable. Rather, Justice Douglas stated
repeatedly the reasons the specific bacteria in the claim, and not
bacteria per se, fall short of constituting an invention:
But however ingenious the discovery of that natural principle [the compatible mixture] may have been, the application of it is hardly more than
an advance in the packaging of the inoculants. Each of the species of rootnodule bacteria contained in the package infects the same group of legu-

minous plants which it always infected. No species acquires a different
use. The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in
the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility.
Each species has the same effect it always had. The bacteria perform in
their natural way. Their use in combination does not improve in any way
their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally
provided
07
and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.

The reasonable implication of this language is that if the action of
102. See notes 71-77 &accompanying text supra.
103. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
104. The usefulness of the patentee's invention is illustrated by the fact that prior
to the claim in Funk Bros. Seed Co., a farmer who produced clover, alfalfa and
soybeans would need to purchase three different types of bacteria-containing
inoculants. The bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, which infected the roots of
the leguminous plants thereby enabling these plants to fix nitrogen from the
air, were believed to be mutually inhibitive. The patentee's claim involved a
mixture of Rhizobium bacteria which had proved not to be mutually inhibitive, thereby allowing the farmer to purchase one inoculant for all varieties of
leguminous plants.
105. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 161 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 1947).
106. 333 U.S. at 131.
107. Id. at 131. See Record, supra note 25, at 38-43. The supporting affidavits of the
three scientists clearly remove the Streptomyces vellosus of the Bergy claim
from the objections of lack of invention as expressed in Funk Bros. Seed Co.
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the bacteria had not been found in nature or the bacteria had not
acted independently of the patentee, the bacteria would be patentable. It follows that if living organisms were absolutely not patentable, there would have been no need for the Court's distinction of
the properties of the invention claimed in Funk Brothers Seed Co.
Funk Brothers Seed Co. was relied upon by Upjohn for the
proposition that if bacteria per se were considered unpatentable,
the Court would have expressly refused the patent for that reason.
The solicitor attempted to counter1 08 Upjohn's reliance on Funk
Brothers Seed Co. on the basis of Dann v. Johnston.l0 9 In
Johnston, the Supreme Court held the inventor's "machine system
u 0
for the automatic recordkeeping of bank checks and deposits""
unpatentable because of obviousness. In doing so, the Court summarily dismissed the need to decide whether the computer program was patentable subject matter under section 101.111 In a
prior statement on the patentability of computer programs, the
Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson," 2 in an expressly limited
holding, had held a specific digital computer program to be unpat113
entable because it was nonstatutory matter.
It does not necessarily follow that the Court's failure to discuss
the patentability of computer programs under section 101 in
Johnston supports the proposition that the failure of the Court in
Funk Brothers Seed Co. to decide the patentability of bacteria per
se was without consequence. The state of the law regarding the
patentability of computer programs and bacteria was clearly distinguishable. The Supreme Court had already addressed, albeit
ambiguously through Benson, the patentability of computer programs. It had expressly stated that all programs would not be considered unpatentable merely because of label." 4 It left open the
possibility that claims may be presented which would not fall
within the scope of Benson and would merit the award of a patent.
It is obvious, therefore, that the Court's need to address the issue
of patentable subject matter in Johnston was not comparable to
the need in Funk BrothersSeed Co., where there had been no prior
statements regarding the patentability of living things under section 101. In contrast to Johnston, the Court in Funk BrothersSeed
108. See Brief, supra note 7, at 12. The solicitor stated the "argument [to be] untenable" that the Court in Funk Bros. Seed Co. would have held the bacteria
to be unpatentable rather than proceeding to invalidate the patent for lack of
invention if it had considered bacteria per se unpatentable.
109. 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
110. Id. at 225.
111. Id. at 220.
112. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
113. Id. at 71-72.
114. Id at 71.
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Co. was presented with a clear opportunity to address the issue of
the patentability of a certain category of things. Because it did not
decide that specific issue, there is a clear indication that the "living" element of the bacteria was irrelevant to patentability. The
same cannot be said of Johnston. The fact that the Court there
dismissed the need to discuss the issue of section 101 in relation to
the computer program claim cannot purport to carry the same implications as the Court's inaction in Funk Brothers Seed Co., because in Benson the Court had already addressed and decided the
relation of section 101 to computer program claims."15
In summary, the refusal to patent the bacteria mixture in Funk
Brothers Seed Co. was premised on a lack of invention, that the
claim "had been plucked from the earth" and not that the bacteria
were alive. Nowhere in the opinion is there any reference indicating that the characteristic of life alone would prohibit patentability. Furthermore, because the "living" concept is so interrelated
with the product of nature principle, it appears reasonable that
Justice Douglas would have used that concept to buttress the refusal to patent the bacteria if it had been thought relevant to his
argument. Because he did not, it is reasonable to1assume
that "liv6
ing" was not relevant to the patentability issue1
Central to the court's argument for the patentability of microorganisms per se in Bergy, is the fact that processes using the life
processes of living organisms have already been held to be patentable subject matter."17 While patent case law does distinguish be115. Thus, the use of Johnston to support the contention that the failure of the
Court in Funk Bros. Seed Co. to decide the issue of patentability of living
things was of no consequence appears to have no merit. Moreover, the claim
in Johnston may have been patentable under section 101. The Court may
have simply chosen to avoid a discussion of that issue when the claim could
be disposed of conclusively on the basis of section 103. Indeed, prior to appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re
Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 771 (C.C.PA 1974), had distinguished the claim in
Johnston from the claim in Benson to its satisfaction and held the program
patentable.
Further support for the patentability of living things is demonstrated in
Justice Frankfurter's condurring opinion in Funk Bros. Seed Co.: "Insofar as
the court below concluded that the packaging of a particular mixture of compatible strains is an invention and as such patentable, I agree, provided not
only that a new and useful property results from their combination, but also
that the particular strains are identifiable and adequately identified." 333
U.S. at 133.
116. The dissenting opinion in Funk Bros. Seed Co. further demonstrates that the
patent claim of a bacteria mixture was considered statutory subject matter
and therefore patentable. 333 U.S. at 136 (Burton, J., dissenting).
117. 563 F.2d at 1037. See City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577
(7th Cir. 1934); Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F.
453 (2d Cir. 1908); Dick v. Lederle Antitoxin Laboratories, 43 F.2d 628
(S.D.N.Y. 1930); Ex parte Prescott & Morikawa, 19 U.S.P.Q. 178 (1932).
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tween the patentability of the tools of the process and the process
itself," 8 it is clear that the microbiological processes that have
been held to be patentable would not exist without the crucial element of the living organism. As in Bergy, the process in which the
microorganism produces lincomycin would not occur without the
living properties of the Streptomyces vellosus. In essence, the
process is totally dependent upon the living material. Thus, in the
words of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Bergy:
It seems illogical to us to insist that the existence of life in a manufacture
or composition of matter in the form of a biologically pure culture of a
microorganism removes it from the category of subject matter which can
be patented while the functioning of a living organism and the utilization
of its life functions in processes does not affect their status under § 101.119

Moreover, if manufacturers and compositions of matter are excluded because they are alive, it follows afortiorithat processes
should also be excluded. Section 101 does not, nor does any other
provision of the patent statute, differentiate between the conditions of patentability for each of the four categories of subject matter.120 Therefore, the argument that the living property is to be
examined differently as to the patentability of processes than as to
the patentability of manufactures or compositions of matter fails
on a theory of statutory interpretation.
In a challenge to the court's argument on this issue, the dissent
in Bergy states that the fact that a "process of using microorganisms constitute[s] patentable subject matter does not logically
compel the conclusion that claims to biologically pure cultures of
microorganisms are patentable."'12 1 In support of this contention
122
the dissent cited In re Waldbaum and Gottschalk v. Benson ,123
held that claims on a method
which
cases
two computer program
covering all practical uses of a mathematical formula and the involved algorithm do not constitute patentable subject matter. In
other words, claims on processes that use an algorithm to operate
a system are considered patentable subject matter while claims on
the algorithm per se are not. 124 The distinguishing factor in this
logic as applied to the claim in Bergy is that the algorithm per se is
being rejected for a characteristic not inherent in the process in
118. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876). Cochrane stands for the settled
principle that "[process] is an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable to
perform the process may or may not be new or patentable; whilst the process
itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new result." Id. at 788.
119. 563 F.2d at 1037.
120. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1976).
121. 563 F.2d at 1041 (Miller, J., dissenting).
122. 559 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Waldbaum II).
123. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
124. CompareIn re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.PA. 1973), with In re Deutsch,
553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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which it is employed. The rejected algorithm claim in Gottschalk v.
Benson' 25 was in essence a mathematical formula-an idea-and,
therefore, unpatentable in its own right. To have allowed the process claim in Benson would have precluded the use of that idea1by
26
anyone else, a result in clear contravention of the patent laws.
Clahms to methods using algorithms to translate information
into the mathematical languages used in computers have been allowed when the use of the algorithm was purely incidental to the
process and the method did not preempt all uses of the algorithm. 127 However, the use of the microorganism, as in Bergy, is
not purely incidental to the process. The very existence of the
process depends upon the specific microorganism. Nor is the objectionable living characteristic of the microorganism separable
from the process in which it is used as is the idea element of the
algorithm used in the method of operation or machinery. Therefore, the use of the computer program cases as authority for viewing the patentability of the use of the tool differently from the
patentability of the tool itself is not logically amenable to the
unique properties of microbiological processes and microorganisms.
Further examination of the line of cases decided under the
product of nature doctrine provides additional insight into the
analysis of whether the court in Bergy properly held living things
to be patentable under section 101. While the amorphous 128 product of nature rule had been the basis for prior patent rejections, 129
it gained additional prominence in patent law when the Supreme
Court relied on the rule to invalidate a patent for an invention
which was admitted by the Court to be useful, ingenious, and commercially successful. In Funk BrothersSeed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co.,' 30 the Court held that the discovered characteristics of certain
mixed cultures of bacteria were no more than the work of nature
and therefore not an invention. According to one writer this judicially created category for rejection has been an unfortunate deterrent to patent applications on inventions arising out of natural
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

409 U.S. 63 (1972).
See generally 1 A. DE.I.iLR, supra note 12, § 25.
In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
See notes 31-33 & accompanying text supra.
Compare American Wood-Paper Co. v. The Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S.
(23 WalL) 566 (1874), and In re Mertz, 97 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938), with
Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co, 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910), and
Parke-Davis & Co. v. ELM Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), afO'd, 196
F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).

130. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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13 1
products, and more specifically, to claims on microorganisms.
by
exhibited
the
resistance
in
This language has also been a factor
the courts to product of nature claims.' 32 The dicta of In re
Mancy, 3 3 distinguished by the court in Bergy, exemplifies such
prejudice. Following Funk Brothers Seed Co. and the passage of
the 1952 amendments to the patent statute, courts generally began
to look beyond the automatic preclusion of the natural products
label and assess the patentability of such claims under the conditions of sections 102134 and 103.135 In Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corp., 3 6 the court was presented with the issue of
whether vitamin B1 2 , the result of processes of extraction, concentration, and purification of natural materials was patentable subject matter. The court held that it was, stating: "There is nothing in
the language of the Act which precludes the issuance of a patent
upon a 'product of nature' when it is a 'new and useful composition
is compliance with the specified conditions for
of matter' and there
37
patentability."'
Similarly, in In re Bergstrom,138 the applicant sought a patent
on two distinct chemical compounds which had been isolated from
known crude, semipurified extracts of an animal secretion. The
court held the invention to be patentable. Rejecting the Examiner's holding that the compounds were naturally occurring and
therefore not "new," the court concluded that the compounds did
not exist in nature because "pure" materials are by definition new
with respect to their "impure" natural state. 39 It is clear from the
decision in In re Bergstrom that the product of nature rule is no
longer read as conclusive to the nonpatentability of inventions
which arise out of discoveries of naturally occurring materials.
Rather, the invention must be examined as would any other seeking a patent under sections 102 and 103. Such a test assures that
the patentability of an invention will be determined by standards
sufficiently rigorous to prevent infringement of inventions that
should appropriately be claimed by Mother Nature.
The significance of the product of nature doctrine to the claim
in Bergy is that the doctrine was promulgated in Funk Brothers
Seed Co. in which the patent claim at issue was for a culture of

131. Wegner, Patent Protectionfor Novel Microorganisms Useful for the Preparation ofKnown Products,5 INTL REV. INDus. PRop. & COPYRIGHT L. 285 (1974).

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 288 n.8.
499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P-.A 1974).
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). See text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). See text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 161.
427 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P.A- 1970).

139. Id. at 1402.
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bacteria, a living composition of matter. Indeed, the product of nature theory served as the only basis for the rejection of that
claim.140 It is reasonable, therefore, that just as the product of nature rule has been abrogated to allow the patentability of products
which through the inventive genius of humans, have been made
pure and completely distinct from the original natural product, so
also should it allow the patentability of a pure culture of Streptomyces vellosus which does not exist in nature and is considered
human-made by all parties. As stated by one commentator.
A final strawman is that a microorganism is a "living" being, and as such
neither a "composition of matter" nor "manufacture." No criterion is
raised in 35 USC § 101 that something must be dead to be patentable. The
microorganism should not be excluded as a statutory composition of matter any more than the vitamin B 12 of the Merck cases, merely based upon
that the microorganism is "alive" and the vitathe additional distinction
14 1
min B 12 is dead.

B.

Plant Patent Legislation

Central to the dissent's argument in Bergy against the patentability of the microorganism is the congressional enactment of the
Plant Patent Act of 1930142 which extended patent protection to the
inventors of asexually reproduced plants which meet the requisite
conditions of patentability as provided in the patent statute. Noting that the language of section 101 did not specifically proscribe
plants from the class of acceptable subject matter, the dissent contended that the Plant Patent Act would have been superfluous if
section 101 had been construed to include living things in 1930.
A substantial volume of legislative history1 4 3 substantiates the
fact that the intent of the plant patent legislation was to benefit
agriculture and horticulture by extending incentives to those industries for the development of needed plant inventions. As stated
by Senator Townsend, a co-sponsor of the plant patent bill, "[t] he
purpose of this bill is to authorize the grant of patents on new varieties of plants and thus give to agriculturists the same privileges
that have been enjoyed by industrial inventors and discoverers
during the last century."144 Additionally, case law indicates that
with the passage of the Plant Patent Act of 1930, new, useful, and
unobvious plants were accorded patent protection for the first time
and, therefore, could not have been considered patentable under
140.
141.
142.
143.

333 U.S. at 131.
Wegner, supra note 133, at 290.
35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1976).
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930); HJL REP. No. 1129, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1930); A Bill to Providefor Plant Patents: Hearingson H.R.

11372 Before the House Comm on Patents,71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930).
144. 72 CONG. Ruc. 8750-51 (1930) (remarks of Senator Townsend).
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section 101. In In re Grice,145 the inventor sought plant patents on
two "Rosa Floribunda Plants." The Board of Appeals had rejected
the application under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 146 because the inventions
had appeared in English publications one year prior to the filing of
the patent applications. On appeal to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals the issue was whether the applicant could be refused a plant patent because of the invention's failure to meet the
conditions of patentability in the patent statute in addition to
those of the Plant Patent Act of 1930. Finding that the history and
policy of the Plant Patent Act required that the plant patent applications be considered under the conditions of the patent statute,
the court in Grice stated: "35 U.S.C. § 161 engrafts the Plant Patent
Act onto the basic patent law,"1 47 thereby "remov[ing] the existing
discrimination between plant developers and industrial inventors."148

In addition, a review of other authorities indicates that at the
time of passage of the Plant Patent Act of 1930, plants were not
considered by Congress to be encompassed within section 101. In
a 1953 article on the topic of patent protection for biological specimens and products, one commentator wrote of an attempt made in
1928 to enact legislation which would provide protection for the inventors of all plants and animals. 149 The wide scope of the requested legislation was significantly reduced when finally passed
in 1930 and covered only asexually reproduced plants.
Although microorganisms are living, they are clearly distinguishable in functional properties from plants. 150 Therefore, it
145. 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
146. (1976). This section reads:
Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent.
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this
country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States ....
147. 301 F.2d at 933.
148. Id. at 932 (quoting from the Committee on Patents). The Committee on Patents stated further- "No one has advanced a just and logical reason why reward for service to the public should be extended to the inventor of a
mechanical toy and denied to the genius whose patience, foresight, and effort
have given a valuable new variety of fruit or other plant to mankind." Id.
149. Dienner, Patentsfor BiologicalSpecimens and Products,35 J. PAT. Off. Soc'Y
286,290 (1953). See also Rossman, PlantPatents,13 J. PAT. Off. Soc'y 7 (1931);
Thorne, Relation of Patent Law to Natural Products, 6 J. PAT. Off. Soc'y 23
(1923).

150. See von Pechmann, NationalandInternationalProblems Concerningthe Protection of MicrobiologicalInventions, 3 INT'L

REV. INDUS. PRop.

& COPYRIGHT

L 295 (1972). The author distinguishes the functional properties of plants
and microorganisms:
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does not necessarily follow as reasoned by the court in Bergy that
since plants did not constitute patentable subject matter within
section 101 prior to 1930, microorganisms should also be considered
nonstatutory subject matter. Plants and microorganisms have
been considered by both the courts and Congress as entirely distinguishable from one another. In In re Arzberger,151 the inventor
applied for a plant patent on a species of bacteria isolated and cultured by him. Expressing no indication as to the patentability of
the bacteria under other provisions of the patent statute, the court
held that the Plant Patent Act read "in the common language of
the people" did not encompass bacteria even though it was established that bacteria were scientifically defined as plants. 52 Rather,
the plants covered by the statute were those grown by nurserymen
and agriculturalists pursuant to the purpose of the legislation, for
the benefit of agriculture. In addition, as Chief Judge Markey
stated in his concurring opinion in In re Chakrabarty,153 "[t]he
legislative history of the Plant Protection Statute of 1930 or of the
Plant Variety Protection Act ... does not establish that Congress
thought it was overcoming an objection to plants as unpatentable
solely because they were 'alive."'15 4
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assert that while the Congress
in 1930 believed that the intent of the patent statute was not to
include plants or other living organisms, the initial lawmakers may
very well have intended the statute to provide protection for such
inventions. If the spirit of the constitutional provision and the statute is to encourage inventions that are for the benefit of society, it
may be argued that the significant benefits of microorganisms secured to the public do just that;155 and these enabling provisions
[A] new microorganism, in contradistinction to a plant, is as a rule

only an auxilliary material for the solution of a technical problem.
The microorganism or, more specifically, its fermentation system

serves as a reagent or a catalyst in connection with the biochemical
production of new or known substances. Unlike with a plant variety,
it will not be possible to see in the vegetative propagation of a microorganism the protectable step which leads directly to the practical
development of the salient properties of the product resulting from

the culture.
Id. at 300.

151. 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940).

152. Id. at 838.
153. 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A 1978) In Chakrabarty,the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, subsequent to Bergy, held patentable a new strain of bacteria highly

useful in combating oil spills. See also notes 180-84 &accompanying text
infra.
154. Id.at 44 (Markey, C2., concurring).
155. See Edelbute, MicrobiologicalApplications and Patents,in THE ENCYCLOPEDmA OF PATENT PRACTiCE AND INvENTiO MANAGEMENT 567 (I. Calvert ed.

1964).
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should be read in light of the changing needs of today's industry
and the constant discoveries of modern technology. Whether the
patent statute should be construed as presently written, or specifically amended to cover biological products, has been said to depend solely upon a question of policy. "[D] oes the country desire
to give encouragement to the development of new biological products and specimens, both plant and animal?"156 The Solicitor for
the Patent Office contended that the question addressed and decided by the court in Bergy was "a policy matter which cannot...
be deemed the proper subject for interstitial judicial legislation.
157
Appellants' remedy is with Congress.'
When presented with the question of whether living things constituted patentable subject matter, the court in Bergy deemed it to
be within its judicial discretion to extend the patent laws to these
inventions and not a policy matter which necessitated the express
action of Congress. This judicial interpretation appears well-reasoned and valid in light of the intent of the constitutional clause
and the patent statute, the important industrial function of microorganisms, the fact that the microorganism is considered the manufacture of a microbiologist, the fact that life processes employing
the crucial life functions have long been held to be patentable, and
the fact that there is no express language in legislative or judicial
authority that precludes the patentability of living things.
C. The Desirability of Patenting Living Matter
The use of microorganisms in pharmaceutical and related research is a large and essential business. Concern regarding the
policies and the mechanics of patenting these tools has been expressed both in industry and in the international scientific community. 5 8 Considering the industrial importance of the
microorganism, it is arguable on a public policy basis that just as
the inventors of chemical compounds have long enjoyed the protection of the patent laws to ensure the development and dedication to the public of new chemical compounds, the inventors of
these useful microorganisms should also receive patent protection.
Because of a characteristic unique to microorganisms and
which is not present in chemical compounds, one commentator
presents a series of arguments illustrating that the need to patent
microorganisms is greater than the need to patent chemical compounds. 5 9 He contends that chemical compounds would be devel156. Dienner, supra note 149, at 290.
157. Brief, supra note 7, at 20.
158. See Tak, Protection of Applied Microbiology, 5 INr'L Rnv. I.Dus. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 382, 385 (1974).
159. See Wegner, supra note 5, at 237.
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oped and placed on the market "whether or not patent protection
160
has been granted, if the compound is of sufficient importance."'
Once on the market, the compositions of chemical compounds
would be readily discernible through analysis of the compound by
one skilled in the art. The important distinction between chemical
compounds and microbiological processes is that the starting
materials in the former are not mysteries to one skilled in the art.
Although without the protection of a patent the incentive to invent
useful chemical compounds would be reduced, it would not be
completely diminished, and American industry would benefit from
those chemical compounds which continue to be marketed.
A very different situation exists with regard to detecting the
starting materials in microbiological processes producing patentable end products. The virtual impossibility that one skilled in the
art will duplicate the microorganism requires that these tools be
patented in preference to other inventions. Prior to Bergy, in
claims involving these processes, only the patented end product
would be marketed and not the production process itself. The
process and its tools were protected by trade secret, thereby effectively keeping these inventions from the public. As stated by the
commentator.
[Albsent larceny or blind luck of a competitor, [it would be impossible] to
reproduce the microorganism necessary to conduct a trade secret microbiological process for the production of the new end product. The inventor
would be able to reap the fruits of his invention through the sale of the
product produced by his secret process, while maintaining the secrecy of
the microorganism used in the process. In this way, the inventor would be
able to exploit his invention and the public would not have the benefit of
the use of the microorganism after the expiration of a limited period as
would be the case where an invention is protected by a patent. Perhaps

equally important is the fact that industry would be deprived of the disclosure of1 6 the
microorganism for experimental purposes of further re1
search.

Therefore, while the inventor of the microorganism used in
processes producing patentable end products may choose to protect thL invention by trade secret with the additional assurance
that it would be most unlikely that the microorganism would become public knowledge, public interest is better served by an interpretation permitting microorganisms per se to be patentable
because the patent would add incentive to make public a very concealable tool. While the claim in In re Bergy did not involve a process with a patentable end product, it is not unreasonable to
assume that inventors of such processes would take advantage of
160. Id.
161. Id.
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the patent process to secure protection for the total invention-the
process, the microorganism, and the end product.
Additionally, in the interest of the continued development of
the microbiological industries, an even more apparent need for
patent protection for microorganisms is demonstrated by the large
number of processes using microorganisms in the production 162
of
previously known and, therefore, unpatentable end products.
The inventor of this type of process has had the option of either
marketing the unpatentable end product and retaining the process
for the production by means of trade secret, or of patenting the
process itself provided it met the conditions of sections 102163 and
103.164 By selecting the former course, the inventor could effectively keep the information regarding the process from the public.
An extension of patent protection to microorganisms would encourage the inventor of this type of process to patent that tool and
perhaps the process which uses the tool to arrive at a specific result.
If the inventor were to choose to patent the process, he or she
would have dedicated to the public the use of those tools of the
process that were themselves unpatentable. If microorganisms are
unpatentable, they are free to be used by the public. Under section 112,165 if a microorganism is one of the process tools, the inventor as a part of the enabling disclosure places on deposit in a
public depository a sample of the microorganism which will in turn
be made readily available to the public once the patent for the
process is issued.166 Therefore, the virtually impossible task of duplicating the microorganism is avoided by anyone wishing to use it
167
for other than the patented process. The court in In re Mancy
reasoned that the benefit of public access to these valuable but unprotected tools was additional justification for permitting the patent claim:
Indeed, the public interest appears to be well served by encouraging the
patenting of such inventions [processes where a new strain of microorganism producing a known antibiotic is not considered obvious simply because the antibiotic has been produced by a different strain of the same
microorganism]. While the patent will grant appellants a limited right to
exclude others from producing daunorubicin by the use of Streptomyces
bfurcus, the public receives not only the knowledge of appellants' discovery but also access to Streptomyces
bifurcus through its deposit with the
168
Department of Agriculture.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 238.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). See text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). See text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390 (C.CP.A. 1970).
499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
Id. at 1294.
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Although the inventor had patent protection extended to the process producing a specific product, the inventor could not control the
use of the unpatentable tool in its application to other uses. Therefore, if the microorganism was believed to be useful in other
processes, a natural result would be for the inventor to maintain
the process and microorganism under trade secret rather than patent it, thereby keeping the valuable information from the public.
Allowing microorganisms to be patented will ensure an increased dedication of microbiological processes and their tools to
industry under the incentives of the patent system. As stated by
one commentator, the "[p]rotection of the new strain itself would
doubtless bring certain advantages to the inventor. Just as with a
chemical product claim, every use of the strain would be protected,
even for processes not discovered by the inventor."'169 Because it
is in the interest of the public to encourage development of new
and improved methods of producing known products, it is reasonable to encourage such a result by extending to the inventor the
exclusive right to the new, useful, and obvious microorganism in
all uses for a limited period of time. This extension of the patent
laws is not unreasonable in light of the public's benefit from (1)
the increased knowledge and benefits secured from the improved
methods of the process, and (2) the increased knowledge and
availability of the tool.
In response to arguments for extending to the inventor of the
microorganism the exclusive right to its use, one commentator has
stated that the realities of microbiological technology do. not require such protection:
[T]he necessity for protection of the microorganism in and of itself does
not appear to be so urgent. In any event, no case is known to me in which
a new strain has at a later point become suitable for the preparation of
other chemical compounds. As a rule, with the protection of the new process of preparation for the antibiotics or with protection of the antibiotic
itself (chemical product protection), the inventor will already
obtain an
17 °
adequate reward for his actual, new technical contribution.

In addition, since the microorganism is usually the means to a specific end, the fact that the protection of the organism would necessarily control the use of the end product should be seriously
17 1
considered by those desiring an extension of the patent laws.
The commentator's contention that patent protection of the
process or the end product would adequately reward the inventor
of the microorganism does not address the fact that the microorganisms in Bergy and similar inventions meet all the conditions for
patentability. There is an implication in his argument that the in169. von Pechmann, supra note 150, at 299.
170. Id. at 301.
171. Id.
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vention must demonstrate usefulness in more than one manner to
justify the award of the patent. Such a requirement is not evident
in the patent provisions. The fact that a microorganism cannot yet
produce more than one chemical, and that a patent at present on
that specific microorganism's process would appear adequate for
the inventor, is not reasonable justification for the denial of a patent award to an invention which in all other respects deserves one.
Furthermore, the commentator's rationalization that the inventor
would be adequately protected by a patent on the antibiotic itself
was not valid in the case of the applicants in Bergy, nor in situations in which scientists have significantly improved on the methods of obtaining important, but already known, end products. The
end product in the Bergy case had been previously patented by
other parties. 172 Finally, the protection accorded the inventor by
merely patenting the process does not provide sufficient incentive
and recognition. The alternative of patenting the microorganism
per se would provide the greatest encouragement for further research.
The commentator also contended that protection of the microorganism would control the use of the end product.173 However,
that is not true of the claim in Bergy and comparable claims to
microorganisms employed in processes producing known and unpatentable end products. A patent award to the Streptomyces
vellosus in Bergy would not preclude another inventor from isolating and culturing a microorganism to produce it in a more efficient
manner. Indeed, that is precisely what the scientists in Bergy succeeded in doing. While a patent on the microorganism would not
control the use of the end product, it would entitle the inventor to
exclusive control over the use of the specific organism. That right
bestows no greater privileges than those accorded the inventors of
patentable chemical compounds.
Even to those who believe patenting microorganisms is a reasonable extension of the patent laws, there is the troublesome
question of whether section 101 will be or should be further extended to encompass more complex forms of living organisms. To
answer this question, it is necessary to review In re Bergy and determine whether there is a discernible scope to the holding, and
whether there is a standard by which attorneys, examiners, and
courts may judge the patentability of more complex forms of life.
The importance of determining whether a clear standard exists is
evidenced by the open expression of concern-the "far-fetched
fears" described by the court in Bergy-over the patenting of
higher forms of life. As one patent attorney stated in reference to
172. Record, supra note 25, at 21.
173. von Pechman, supra note 150, at 299-302.
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Bergy: "As soon as you discuss patenting living organisms, people
have visions of 1984."174 An analysis of the court's language
reveals that it did not provide any express limits to patentability.
Indeed, if a court was to find it necessary to draw a line distinguishing microorganisms from higher forms of life, the summary
reasoning expressed on that issue in Bergy would provide little
guidance. Instead, a study of inferences is necessary to determine
the scope of patent protection accorded living things.
Subsequent to finding the living quality to be legally irrelevant
to patentability, the court in Bergy held the microorganism to be a
qualified invention for the following reasons: (1) it was a new
human-made product; (2) it was "an industrial product used in an
industrial process-a useful or technological art if ever there was
one;"1 7 5 (3) it was an obvious industrial tool; and (4) it was in the
176
public interest to encourage the development of this invention.
Thus, the approach taken by the court was comparable to that it
would take in examining the application of any invention-whether the invention meets the conditions of sections 102177
and 103.178
The sole language of the court intimating that the complexity of
the organism might be relevant to the application was the following: "The nature and commercial uses of biologically pure cultures
of microorganisms like the one defined in claim 5 are much more
akin to inanimate chemical compositions such as reactants, reagents, and catalysts than they are to horses and honeybees or
raspberries and roses. 1u 79 The court then commented on the similarity between the microorganism and the chemical compound,
both of which are valuable tools of the chemist and chemical manufacturers. This comparison indicates that a function analogous to
that of a reactant, reagent or catalyst may be a criterion in evaluating future patent applications for living organisms. However, the
problem with distinguishing the patentability of the microorganism on the basis of such a criterion is readily apparent when the
living function of the microorganism, i.e., the fermentation process
of producing an antibiotic, is compared with the comparable living
functions of the far more complex honeybee or a hypothetical
strain of cow that may produce an improved quantity or quality of
milk. Arguably, if that criterion is used and these forms of life are
174. Otten, supra note 7, at 18.
175. 563 F.2d at 1038.

176. Id.
177. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). See text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
178. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). See text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
179. 563 F.2d at 1038.
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thereby found to meet the conditions of sections 102 and 103, they
too would be patentable subject matter under Bergy.
On March 2, 1978, five months after In re Bergy, the Court of
8 0°
Customs and Patent Appeals decided In re Chakrabarty, which
a
strain of
In
Chakrabarty,
holding.
Bergy
the
arguably broadened
bacteria highly useful in combating ocean oil spills had been rejected by both the Examiner and the Board.181 Finding In re Bergy
the controlling precedent on the "living" issue, the court in
Chakrabartyheld that the bacteria were patentable. Although the
court dismissed the significance of the "genetic engineering" and
found no relevant difference between the claims in Chakrabarty
and Bergy, there is an express distinction. The microorganism in
Chakrabarty is one step beyond the "biologically pure culture"
present in In re Bergy and much closer to the DNA technology and
mutation of living organisms that some feel fall within the "farfetched fears" that the court refused to address in Bergy. Some
individuals contend that permitting living things to be patented
"could easily be applied in far out and scary directions; to patent
products of recombinant DNA technology, cloning, cell fusion and
other genetic engineering, perhaps organic modification of animals
or even humans.' 82 The unknown limits of discovery coupled
with the questionable benefits to society of these inventions creates understandable apprehensions. Less objectionable would be
a new improved strain of animal such as the chicken in In re
Merat 83 which provides a product to the American public that is
both desired and beneficial.
The unsettling problem is that the present law as construed in
the aftermath of Bergy and Chakrabarty indicates that those living inventions that are most significantly altered by humans, i.e.,
the "far-fetched" inventions, could be considered patentable while
those with less alteration, such as the chicken, would not. This
theory was substantiated by Chief Judge Markey in his concurring
opinion in Chakrabarty:"There are but two sources for manufactures and compositions of matter. They are God (or "nature" if
one prefers) and man. As presented to us, the invention is admit180. 571 F.2d 40 (C.CYP-.A 1978).
181. The applicant had sought a patent on a new strain of microorganism altered
by "genetic engineering," a process which involved
the incorporation in a single cell [prior inventions had involved bacteria mixtures whose cumulative degradative actions failed to consume the oil from the spills at fast enough rate] by transmission
thereinto of a plurality of compatible "plasmids," of a capacity for
simultaneously degrading several different components of crude oil
with the result that degradation occurs more rapidly.
Id. at 41.
182. Otten, supra note 7, at 18.
183. 519 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P-A. 1975).
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tedly a "manufacture" by man. It therefore falls squarely within
the language of the statute."' 84 Thus, the threshold question to
patentability is whether the living invention has been sufficiently
altered by humans to be considered human-made. For example,
the manufacturing procedure of isolating and culturing an unknown strain of single cell life and developing the production of a
chemical substance which does not normally occur in nature from
that life, is a significant alteration and is distinguishable from the
cross breeding of several strains of known chickens resulting in a
chicken that produces more white meat, a phenomenon occurring
naturally. Arguably, the latter is not enough of an alteration of a
natural product to be a manufacture of humans and would remain
in the product of nature category. On the other hand, "genetic engineering," which is the "creation of new living organisms by combining genetic material from different life forms,' 85 would appear
to be sufficient, and indeed was so held to be in Chakrabarty. Although the narrow holding in Bergy provides the legal mechanism
to protect and encourage the development of microbiological technology and appears well-reasoned and necessary in light of the
needs of industry, the lack of expressed limits of patentability coupled with the little known or understood advanced technologies of
altering life gives rise to concern. Whether this research should
receive the benefit of the patent laws involves questions of policy,
ethics, and science that are well outside the expertise or appropriate function of the courts.
A solution to the question of the potential scope of patentability
is for Congress to articulate the limits of patentable inventions.
This legislation could easily recognize the valuable chemical
properties of living inventions comparable to those in Bergy and
Chakrabarty,and at the same time expressly disallow the patentability of more complex animal forms. Wherever the line is drawn,
a decision on the patentability of an invention that is considered a
higher form of life than the chemically useful microorganism in
Bergy involves issues that can only appropriately be handled by
Congress.
184. 571 F.2d at 45.
185. Brief, supra note 7, at 20. See Berger, Government Regulation ofthe Pursuit
of Knowledge: The RecombinantDNA Controversy,3 VT.L. REV. 83 (1978), in

which the author presents a discussion of "whether to restrict [DNA research] which has only been shown to be potentially hazardous, which involves a quest for new scientific knowledge, and gives man the capability to
design new life forms and ultimately, perhaps, to design future generations of

himself." Id at 109. The average citizen who has an enormous stake in the
potential ramifications of continued DNA research must make that decision.
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CONCLUSION

In view of the purpose of the patent statute and the state of
patent law, Bergy was an appropriate response to the needs of
modern microbiological technology. It is a necessary extension of
the patent laws to protect and encourage research on the microorganism, a living chemical tool highly used and valued in American
industry. In an article published one year prior to Bergy, one
writer forecasted:
With the importance of this [microorganisms chemistry] rapidly
developing field of science having an increasingly significant impact on the
industrialized world, specific protection under the patent laws is called
for, either through the German case law solution of Backerhefe(1861 or
through legislative modernization of the law, to take a realistic view of the
science of microorganisms chemistry as being a part of the world of commerce 18and
not merely a colorful curiosity of nature under a child's micro7
scope.

Although in Bergy, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
provided a timely answer, it may be concluded from the holding in
Parkerv. Flook' 88 and the vacation of Bergy 8 9 that the Supreme
Court of the United States does not consider itself the appropriate
vehicle for the expansion of the patent laws into new areas of technology. This appears to be so even when the expansion may be
achieved by reasonable judicial interpretation of the patent statute
and its policy and purposes as was evidenced by the decision of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Bergy.
Under the Supreme Court's view, it now appears that if the invention or area of technology involved in a patent application was
"wholly unforeseen" by Congress at the time of the enactment of
the patent statute, protection cannot and should not be given to
the invention. Instead, Congress must expressly address the intended patentability of the new area of technology. The message
to American industry is clear. If protection is desired in order to
bolster the incentives and increase the monies for development in
the newest of technologies, the advocates of such protection will
need to initiate the necessary legislation and convince Congress
186. Backerhefe [Baker's Yeast], 6 Irr'L REV. INDUS. PRop. & COPYRIGHT L.207
(1975), was decided by the German Federal Supreme Court on March 11,
1975. The court held a microorganism patentable as an invention so long as
the inventor could show a reproducible method of producing the microorganism.
187. Wegner, supra note 5, at 246.
188. 98 S. Ct. 2522 (1978).
189. 98 S. Ct. 3119 (1978).
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that such legislation will proximately result in the promotion of
the inventive skills and products of American industry.
Diane Kay McDonald '79

